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Abstract 
Using longitudinal data that we have collected on friendship and advice relations 
in a cohort of MBA students, we examine how status affects the dynamics of 
network ties among peers. Estimates of Stochastic Actor-Oriented Models 
(SAOMs) suggest that status is a consequence of network ties because over time 
the level of status attributed to individual students by other students tends to the 
average level of status attributed to their network partners – a phenomenon we 
call status assimilation.  Status is also an antecedent to network ties because it 
affects partner selection decisions giving rise to distinct forms of social 
attachment. We find that both network-based processes of status assimilation, as 
well as status-based processes of social selection are present, but vary subtly yet 
significantly across network domains. Students tend to the average level of status 
of their friends, but not that of their advisors. High-status students are more 
active in the friendship network, but more popular in the advice network. We find 
evidence of performance homophily rather than status homophily: students with 
similar grades are more likely to exchange friendship and advice ties. High status 
students tend to be more central in the advice network, but status attributions spill 
over through friendship, rather than advice relations.  The study documents how 
the relation between social status and social networks varies both over time, as 
well as across network domains. The study also demonstrates the importance of 
accounting for multiplexity – the tendency of a network to operate through 
another.   
 
Keywords: Academic performance; Education; Network dynamics; Peer Effects; 
Schooling; Social influence; Social networks; Social selection; Social status; 
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INTRODUCTION 
Because: “Status-based social forces often threaten to break the ties between increasingly 
differentiated members of a group thus putting at risk the survival of the collectivity” (Bothner, 
Stuart and White, 2004: 262) it is hard to think of a more consequential sociological problem 
than establishing the causal relation linking change in social status and change in social 
networks.   
This relation has been the object of considerable debate in recent studies of organizations and 
social networks (Chen et al., 2012; Sauder, Lynn and Podolny, 2012). The direction of 
causality, however, remains difficult to ascertain unambiguously because of the tendency of 
“status-based social forces” to be both antecedents, as well as consequences of network ties. 
Status is an antecedent of network ties in that it affects individual preferences for social 
interaction giving rise to distinct forms of preferential attachment and social exchange (Blau, 
1964; McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 1987). For example, high status individuals are typically 
more likely to receive recognition for their achievements and attract valuable resources. As a 
consequence, high status individuals tend to be considered more desirable partners and, 
therefore, are more likely to attract network ties (Rossman, Esparza and Bonacich, 2010).  
Status is also a consequence of social networks because of its inherent tendency to spill over - 
or “leak” - through social relations (Podolny, 2001).  For example, Kilduff and Krackhardt 
(1994) argue that the status and prominence of network partners increase the reputation for 
performance of the focal individual thus making him or her more likely to attain a higher level 
of prominence and status among peers. In more general terms, extant research shows that 
individuals connected to high status alters are typically viewed more favorably and are 
therefore attributed even higher status (Podolny, 1993; Thye, 2000). Conversely, the status of 
individuals tied to low-status alters is frequently discounted and devalued (Blau 1964). One 
observable macro-outcome of these self-reinforcing micro-mechanisms is social stratification 
or status ordering (Fiske, 2010). 
Contemporary research recognizes that the interdependence between social status and social 
networks depends on the fact that: “For any given bounded group, we can conceive its 
(informal) status hierarchy as a web of deference relations among its members” (Sauder, Lynn 
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and Podolny, 2012). Deference relations signal - but simultaneously produce and reproduce – 
interpersonal status differences.   
In this paper we seek to advance this line of inquiry by showing how an explicitly network 
approach reveals subtle aspects of the dynamic relation linking social status and social 
networks.  Our work complements and extends prior research in three ways.  First, we 
reconstruct status as deriving from the accumulation of gestures of deference as expressed by 
subjects at different time points (Gould, 2002). Treating status as the aggregate outcome of a 
decentralized system of social perceptions, reduces the possibility that status be affected by 
strategic manipulations of network positions, and provides a direct measure of participants’ 
perceptions of others (Martin, 1998).  Second, while much empirical research on status has 
been conducted within the boundaries of one specific network domain, we examine how the 
antecedents and consequences of status are contingent on – and vary across different network 
domains (White, 1992). More specifically, we examine how the general principle of 
assimilation according to which: “network actors adapt their own individual characteristics to 
match those of their own social neighborhood” (Steglich et al., 2006: 48) varies across different 
kinds of social networks. Third, we specify and estimate a recently derived class of Stochastic 
Actor-Oriented Models (SAOMs) allowing joint representation of change in social status and 
network ties (Snijders, van de Bunt and Steglich, 2010). While extensive empirical research is 
available on how the level of individual status and the presence, absence or strength of network 
ties might be related, little or no research is available on how change in status affects change in 
network ties over time (Sauder, Lynn and Podolny, 2012).  In this paper we examine the joint 
dynamics linking change in network ties and change in individual status.   
The empirical context that sets the stage of our study is provided by longitudinal data that we 
have collected on a cohort of students enrolled in a professional program offered by an elite 
Italian university. We focus on network of advice and friendship relations because prior 
research has demonstrated that these network domains tend to be sociologically relevant in 
general (Kilduff, and Krackhardt, 2008) – but are particularly meaningful in educational 
settings (Kilduff, 1990) where collaborative and competitive processes often operate through 
social networks. Friendship and advice networks are also useful because they represent good 
examples of expressive and instrumental relations, respectively. This is an important distinction 
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in our case because:  “Instrumental network ties are those developed for information, advice, 
and resource exchanges that are needed to accomplish tasks. Expressive ties are ties carrying 
either positive or negative emotions that are not necessarily task-related” (Yuan and Gay, 2006: 
1062).  Both type of ties are relevant to the overall educational attainment process (Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2002). 
We adopt a common definition of status as the accumulation of acts of deference (Podolny and 
Phillips, 1996).  In our context, acts of deference are related to contribution to learning as 
perceived and reconstructed by respondents. To foreshadow the discussion that we develop in 
the empirical part of the paper, change in the status attributed to students in our sample is 
reconstructed as change in the aggregate number of reported acts of deference received during 
the observation period. Therefore, a student who is attributed high status by peers will be 
central in the network of deference relations.  The relation we postulate between attributed 
status and network centrality is common in sociological studies of status (Faris and Felmlee, 
2011).  
The research context that frames our study is particularly useful because it allows direct 
observation of the social processes of core theoretical interest while at the same time 
facilitating the control of typically unobservable factors linked to individual qualities that may 
confound the causal relation linking change in network ties to change in attributions of social 
status.   
STATUS AS ANTECEDENT AND CONSEQUENCE OF SOCIAL NETWORKS 
Social status and social networks stand in a dynamic relation of mutual constitution: change in 
one establishes the conditions for change in the other. Most available studies of social status 
tend to ignore interlocked processes of network and status change to espouse an “ego-centric” 
view of status change as a consequence of change in individual traits or behavior. More 
recently an “alter-centric” view of status has emerged based on the observation that  
”deference cannot be seized by an actor but rather is something that is awarded by others” 
(Sauder, Lynn and Podolny 2012: 273).  In this study, we articulate this view in a professional 
educational setting where status differences among students emerge through the accumulation 
of reported acts of deference and attributions, and where networks involve advice and 
friendship relations observed among students (Lomi, Snijders and Torló, 2011). Longitudinal 
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studies of social status and social networks typically examine change only in one direction 
without accounting for the fact that status may be both a consequence and an antecedent of 
social networks.  
Evidence in support of the view that status is a consequence of network ties is extensive. For 
example, in their reanalysis of the classic Sampson’s (1968) monastery data set, Bonacich and 
Lloyd (2004) show that a positive connection with a high status alter increases ones status and, 
symmetrically, that positive connection to a low status alter decreases one’s own status. 
Rossman, Epsaraza and Bonacich (2010) show that movie stars with prestigious costars are 
more likely to be nominated for an Academy Award. More generally, current research on social 
status accepts that individual status is influenced by the status of network associates (Sauder, 
Lynn, and Podolny, 2012). Actors connected to high status alters are typically viewed more 
favorably and are therefore attributed higher status (Podolny, 1993). In more general terms, 
these studies suggest that signals of status are transmitted by and through network ties (Kilduff 
and Krakhardt, 1994; Podolny, 2005). Equally important is the evidence that this literature 
contributes to the view of networks not only as pipes for the flow of resources, but as 
interpretive lenses that support inference about unobservable quality of potential partners 
(Podolny, 2001).  
Similarly extensive is research portraying status as an antecedent, rather than a consequence of 
network ties (Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve and Tsai, 2004).  For 
example, in their study of advice relations among lay judges in the Commercial Court of Paris, 
Lazega, Mounier, Snijders and Tubaro (2011) treat status differentials as causal factors in the 
formation and change of advice ties. Confirming Blau’s insight (1964), Lazega, Mounier, 
Snijders and Tubaro (2011) find that status is exchanged for advice: as a consequence the 
structure of the advice network connecting the judges is shaped by the tendency of high-status 
judges to attract a significant larger number of network ties.  
Status not only affects the individual propensity of actors to receive or send network ties, but 
also the kind of “alters” that are more likely to stand at the receiving end of the relation. In 
other words, status may also be analyzed in terms of its dyadic consequences - not only in 
terms of “who forms ties,” but also of “who forms ties with whom.” Studies in which status is 
measured more conventionally in terms of an individual attribute (e.g., as “marital” status, 
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“educational” status, or “occupational” status) recording membership in an exogenous category 
tend to support classic “status homophily” arguments (Lazersfield and Merton, 1954). Status 
homophily posits that individuals of similar status, i.e., members in the same socio-
demographic category, are more likely to be related (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 
2001)1. Because social categories are also discursive entities, these results say little about the 
effects of category membership per se and may be interpreted only with reference to the “range 
in social meanings by which individuals understand and construct their world” (Pachucki and 
Breiger, 2010: 206). These considerations shift the focus of attention from social classification 
to processes of social construction of the status value attached to nominal characteristics, and of 
emergence of shared status beliefs (Mark, Smith-Lovin and Ridgeway, 2009). 
Studies based on a relational view of status as resulting from individual acts of deference and 
affiliation (Sauder, Lynn and Podolny 2012) have reported variable – and partly contrasting - 
results. This may be due to the fact that affiliation-based status resulting from acts of deference 
produces “multifaceted and encompassing” information (Podolny, 1993: 834) which typically 
requires assumptions about the distribution of individual abilities to read status signals. Results 
of earlier studies supporting hypotheses of status homophily (Chung, Singh, and Lee, 2000) 
tend to co-exist with results produced by more recent studies arguing and showing that both 
higher-status as well as lower-status actors may find it beneficial to establish status-
heterophilous ties (Smith, Menon, and Thompson. 2012). These more recent results suggest 
that status-dependent social selection processes may produce very different equilibrium 
outcomes: without explicit reference to situational factors it is difficult to predict a priori 
whether segregating mechanisms of status homophily, or blending mechanisms of status 
heterophily will dominate.  
The arrival point of our discussion is that in available studies causality seems as likely to flow 
from status to the formation, maintenance and dissolution of network ties, as it is to flow in the 
opposite direction. To go beyond the simple acknowledgement of the problem, analysis of 
social status and social networks requires a framework sensitive to situational factors affecting 
the direction of the causal relation connecting them in specific relational contexts.  In the 
                                                     
1 We are using the term “category” because we want to avoid the confusion between “status” and 
“class” identified and discussed by Chan and Goldothorpe (2007). 
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section that follows, we describe an empirical study that we have designed to address these 
concerns. Our emphasis on change and longitudinal network analysis allows us to illuminate 
the dynamic relation linking status and network ties. Our focus on co-evolutionary mechanisms 
helps us to articulate change in status and change in social networks as mutually constitutive 
processes.   
SETTING 
The empirical opportunity for examining the relation between change in social networks and 
change in social status is provided by data that we have collected on students enrolled in a full-
time master in business administration (MBA) program, in an élite Italian school for 
professional management education. Educational contexts provide ideal social setting for the 
study of status because – unlike formal organizations – students’ behavior is rarely affected by 
pre-assigned roles, or by differences in formal hierarchical positions. As a consequence, the 
notion of “peer” is frequently used in educational settings to suggest the tendency of students to 
consider each other as living and sharing a similar experience. DiMaggio and Garip (2012) 
provide a comprehensive review of results on network effects produced by more recent 
research in the sociology and economics of education and in related literatures.  
The full-time program we selected for study attracts students oriented toward managerial 
careers in private and public companies, consulting and service firms, and in the financial 
sector. Students come from a variety of backgrounds, but all have a proven record of academic 
achievement. Although they start the program without knowing each other, students spend a 
considerable amount of time in and out of the classroom – at least 8 hours a day during the first 
12 months of the program. The program requires students to coordinate and collaborate on 
many activities such as gathering and analyzing data, preparing and delivering presentations, 
and preparing for case discussions.  
The context of professional education is particularly useful to our purpose because an analysis 
of the co-dependence of interpersonal networks and individual status is likely to sustain more 
convincing results in situations where social networks as well as individual outcomes are 
constructed by a fixed set of social actors sharing contextual constraints. Also, the specific 
setting selected is relevant in terms of the more general issues that we want to address because 
programs in leading business schools are explicitly designed to emulate socialization and social 
 
9 
 
learning processes similar to those of large professional companies. Because of the heavy 
course schedule and workload, MBA programs represents social settings in which individual 
achievement is mediated by a variety of social processes embedded in networks of advice and 
friendship relations (Kilduff, 1990). Consistent with classic insight on the role of social 
networks in the labor market (Granovetter, 1974), our field work demonstrates that MBA 
students in our sample are well aware of the opportunity provided by attending business 
schools to build a portfolio of social connections that may be mobilized in the future as their 
business careers unfold. As a result, we would expect processes of social influence and social 
selection to be particularly transparent in this empirical setting.  
RESEARCH DESIGN DATA AND METHODS 
Data 
We followed a cohort of 75 students enrolled in a full-time master in business administration in 
an élite Italian school for professional management education. The cohort is a meaningful 
social unit in our case because students enrolled in the program were not subdivided into 
different classes or streams, nor were they assigned to permanent teams or work groups. The 
data set we analyze is the result of a three-wave network-panel design. The overall observation 
period is defined by the entire duration of the MBA program dedicated to coursework. The 
program starts in November. The observation points are roughly equally spaced (March, July, 
and November). A 5-month in-company project concludes the program. 
We collected information on (i) individual attributes, (ii) network ties among students, and (iii) 
students’ status (as defined below). Building on prior research on intra-personal networks we 
selected two distinct relational contents to define network ties: friendship and advice.  Students 
in the cohort occasionally work in groups – but they are not assigned to permanent groups to 
encourage socialization and exposure to different alters. Their performance is evaluated 
individually. A questionnaire was administered at the beginning of the study to verify the 
absence of prior social relations between the students. Figures 1a and 1b provide a graphical 
illustration of the evolution of the corresponding networks during the period of observation. 
The black squares in the matrices record the presence of a network tie between the 
corresponding row and column element. While the overall network densities do not change 
much over time, the various local configurations of network ties exhibit considerable local 
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variations. This is illustrated by changes in the local neighborhoods highlighted in the figures. 
The next section provides a complete description of the variables and measures used. 
--- [Insert Figure1a and Figure1b about here] ---  
Variables and measures 
We collected information on a variety of individual attributes to control for socio-demographic 
differences. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. To complete the program students are 
required to complete a total of 32 exams. The maximum grade is thirty and eighteen is the 
lowest passing grade. Average overall performance is 25.98 (s.d. = 1.59, range 20-30).We 
received information on grades directly from the MBA program office.  
--- [Insert Table 1 about here] --- 
We collected information on social networks through questionnaires administered individually 
to each student in three distinct occasions (100% response rate in each of the three waves). 
Building on extensive prior research about social networks in academic and other 
organizations, we selected two distinct relational contents: friendship and program-related 
advice (Cross et al., 2001; Kilduff, 1992). To collect relational information we relied on the so 
called “roster method” (Kilduff and Krackhardt, 2008). Each respondent (‘ego’) was presented 
with a complete list of names and asked to report the presence of the specified relation with 
other class members. For friendship we asked respondents to indicate the names of classmates 
(‘alters’) with whom they felt they had developed meaningful social ties outside the specific 
context of the program. The questionnaire specified examples of joint social activities that 
might be considered as signals of friendship such as going to the movies, having dinner, 
playing football or going shopping. For advice relations, we asked respondents to indicate the 
names of other students whom they recurrently consulted for help and support on course-related 
tasks. The questionnaire included examples of concrete activities that might signal the presence 
of advice relations such as asking for class notes, borrowing books, calling for help to solve 
difficult homework problems, and discussing course material. The questions were framed in a 
non-judgmental manner. Respondents were reassured that there were no right or wrong 
answers, that their privacy would be protected and, and that they were completely free to select 
as many or few names as they wished. In the first panel, we also verified the existence of ties 
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existing before the beginning of the program, but none were reported. The questions about 
friendship and advice ties were asked identically on each of the three data collection occasions. 
At each observation point the network questionnaires generated two square adjacency matrices 
of size 75. In each matrix the generic cell xijkt is equal to 1 if row actor i indicated the presence 
of relation k with column actor j at time t, otherwise xijkt = 0.  In relational observation schemes, 
the number of observations in each network is typically considered equal to the number of pairs 
of actors, i.e., 75x74 = 5550. Hence the analysis of each network is based on 16,650 (5550x3) 
non-independent observations. Table 2 reports the main descriptive statistics of the two 
networks. While the average degree does not change much over time, the presence of 
friendship and advice ties exhibits considerable fluctuation. Friendship and advice ties overlap 
somewhat: the density of the intersection between advice and friendship ties is approximately 
3% (0.028). Because the density of the advice network is approximately 5% (0.055), almost 
50% of advisors are also friends. 
--- [Insert Table 2 about here] --- 
Table 3 reports the change statistics of the networks of friendship and advice, respectively. 
--- [Insert Table 3 about here] --- 
The fundamental actor-specific dependent variable - students’ status– is based on information 
contained in a third network. In the same three data collection occasions we asked students to 
identify names of classmates whom they felt contributed most significantly to their own 
personal learning experience during the program. Information on the content of this third 
network domain was explicitly collected in order to capture expressed deference relations 
among students – the social basis of status. Clearly, individuals cannot control deference 
through decisions or acts of will (Ridgeway 1984: 62). Rather, deference is granted by others 
through deference-conferring gestures (Gould 2002). The building blocks of a group’s status 
hierarchy is the accumulation of deference-conferring gestures linking members to one another 
so that an actor occupies a high-status position if members of the group treat her with deference 
(Lynn et al., 2009). This is particularly the case in social settings that are not structured by an 
exogenous hierarchy of formal positions.  In the case we examine, acts of deference are 
represented by the acknowledgment of others’ contribution to the personal learning experience 
during the program.  The question was designed to reconstruct a notion of status consistent with 
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Magee and Galinsky’s definition of social status as (2008: 353): “The extent to which an 
individual or group is respected or admired by others.” More importantly, our concept of status 
as an aggregate perception is consistent with Martin’s (1998) approach to the analysis of power 
in naturally occurring communities. The unique advantage of conceptualizing status as the 
outcome of an aggregate perception from individual attributions is that in this way respondents 
cannot strategically manipulate their own status. We have, in other words, a direct measure of 
people’s perception of status (Martin, 1998; 198). 
Our approach to status is consistent with the “alter-centric” definition of status as conferred by 
acts of deference, and is particularly appropriate in the context of our study. However, the 
measure we propose is somewhat inconsistent with a strict interpretation of Stochastic Actor 
Oriented Models (SAOMs) – choice-based models where actors are assumed to control only 
their outgoing ties and  to change them based on a multinomial choice probability model 
(Block, Stadtfeld and Snijders, 2017). Strictly speaking, in this framework actors cannot 
“choose” their own status, although actors may prefer a higher to a lower status. To the extent 
they value status, however, actors may try to change the behavior under their direct control to 
attract deference.  For this reason, the results we report below are best interpreted in terms of 
probabilistic tendencies – or as a heuristic solution to a choice problem rather than the unique 
consequence of a sequence of utility-maximizing decisions. To obtain the status measure we 
constructed three adjacency matrices of size 75 (one for each data collection occasion) where 
the generic cell xij is equal to 1 if row actor i has indicated the presence of a relation of 
“deference” with column actor j, otherwise xijk= 0. Then we used these three matrices to 
compute the Indegree centrality score for each respondent, which represents our relational 
measure of status – an approach to status that is increasingly common in current empirical 
research (Lazega et al., 2011). The mean (and standard deviation) of the Indegree centrality in 
the three-time period considered are – respectively: 4.83 (5.29) in T1; 5.76 (5.25) in T2, and 
6.31 (5.12) in T3.  
MBA students compete intensely to be included in the top percentile. Academic performance is 
treated as a signal of their commitment, sense of duty and competence – qualities valued both 
by potential employers, as well as potential business partners. In our sample, a student has high 
status to the extent that many others acknowledge that she has contributed significantly to their 
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own learning experience in the context of the program. The view of status underlying the 
measure that we adopt is consistent with commonly held view of status as resulting from 
individual acts of deference – and hence as a relational asset  (Bothner et al. 2014). We rely on 
current theoretical understanding of status as a: “position in a social hierarchy that results from 
accumulated acts of deference” (Sauder, Lynn, & Podolny, 2012: 268).  In the analysis we 
report in the empirical part of the paper we do not model directly processes of status 
construction (i.e., the “flow” of status through network ties) underlying the accumulation of 
status as an asset. See Podolny and Phillips (1996) for a similar distinction between status as a 
“stock” or as a “flow.” 
Empirical model specification and estimation 
In the empirical part of the paper we rely on a class of stochastic actor-oriented models 
(SAOMs) introduced by Snijders (2001).  SAOMs are probability models for network change 
that assume that actors decide which of their outgoing ties to change according to a multinomial 
discrete choice probability model. A technical treatment of SAOMs may be found in Snijders 
(2005).  An introductory guide to the specification and estimation of SAOMs may be found in 
Snijders, van de Bunt and Steglich (2010). Interested readers are referred to Snijders’ recent 
comprehensive review (2017).  
The feature that makes SAOMs uniquely useful for our current purposes is that they allow joint 
representation of network-based processes of social influence (underlying change in the level of 
individual status), and social selection (underlying change in network ties determined by 
interpersonal similarities and differences in status) (Lewis, Gonzalez, and Kaufman, 2012). 
More specifically, SAOMs allow specification of empirical models admitting the possibility of 
dynamic feedback connections linking change in individual status and change in network 
structure (Steglich, Snijders, and Pearson, 2010).  We adopt the recently derived model for 
multiplex relation proposed by Snijders, Lomi and Torló (2013). This model allows joint 
representation of multiple networks – a feature that helped us to model friendship and advice 
relations as codependent.  
In the model we estimate in the empirical part of the paper, we use average status similarity as 
our main measure of social influence. Suppose that  is the relevant measure of status, then z
 zjizij zzsim  /||1
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average status similarity between an actor i and his network partners is defined as: 
  where xi+ is the outdegree of actor i and
 with  
representing a (scaled) measure of average status similarity2. A significantly positive parameter 
associated with the average similarity effect thus defined may be interpreted as evidence of a 
tendency toward status similarity between network partners.   An alternative interpretation of 
positive average similarity effect would be that status conferred to ego tends to become more 
similar to the status conferred to his or her network partners – an outcome that would be 
consistent with the assimilation principle discussed by Steglich et al. (2006). Alternative 
measures that may be used to represent tendencies toward similarity between networks 
associates produced by social influence are discussed in Snijders, van de Bunt and Steglich 
(2010) 3. 
Parameter estimates of SAOMs may be obtained via Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods as 
explained in Snijders et al. (2007), and implemented in the RSiena software package (Ripley et 
al.  2016). Table 4 summarizes the network effects included in the objective functions 
specifying the network statistics and their interpretation in the context of advice relations. 
-- Insert Table 4 about here— 
Following recommended best practice for the analysis of network dynamics using SAOMs 
(Snijders and Steglich, 2015) we implement a Monte Carlo simulation-based approach to 
evaluate the goodness of fit of the model – i.e., the model’s ability to reproduce the data. Based 
on the empirical estimates we generate a distribution of networks out of which we extract a 
random sample of 1000 networks. We then compare the data with simulated network 
distribution implied by the estimates using the so called violin plots (Hintze and Nelson 1998) 
which combine the information contained in boxplots and a kernel density plots. Additional 
                                                     
2 Clearly, if xi+ = 0, then similarity score of actor i is = 0 because an actor with no network partners is assumed not 
to be susceptible to network influence. 
3 Similarly to Snijders, van de Bunt and Steglich (2010), in the empirical part of the paper we use 
average similarity because preliminary score-type tests indicate that alternative measures of similarity 
that may be adopted do not provide equally useful characterization of processes of social influence in 
our sample.  The logic of score-type tests in SAOM is discussed in Snijders et al. (2007).  
,
_____
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information on this goodness of fit diagnostic approach for SAOMs may be found in Ripley et 
al. (2016).  
RESULTS 
We start by presenting the results of QAP correlations (10,000 permutations) that we have 
computed on the three networks (friendship, advice and deference) across the three periods 
under investigation. Table 5 shows that all the three networks are quite stable over time: within 
correlations are in fact very similar. It is also worth noting that the correlation between the 
advice and friendship networks is relatively weak, while the deference network is more 
strongly associated with the advice network. However, the correlation between the deference 
and advice networks is never very strong, indicating that respondents tend to distinguish 
between “advisers” and “people they defer to”.  
-- Insert Table 5 about here – 
We now present a qualitative interpretation of the estimates, following which we narrow the 
focus of the analysis and provide a post-hoc numerical interpretation of the parameters of main 
theoretical interest. Table 6a reports the estimates of parameters in the evaluation function 
specifying how individual status changes as a function of individual attributes and status of 
network associates.  For each network (friendship and advice) we estimated four models which 
we report in an increasing order of completeness and complexity of the underlying 
specification. The first model is a baseline (“trend only”) model. The second model also 
contains the effects of the structural (i.e., network-based endogenous) network change 
mechanisms as well as factors that may affect individual status. The third model is more 
comprehensive and controls for a number of exogenous factors (control covariates) that may 
affect the network evolution. The fourth model (full) reports the complete set of estimates for 
the social influence and social selection functions. Finally, we report a fifth model (multiplex) 
which reports the determinants of individual status when simultaneously analysing the two 
networks under investigation (friendship and advice) in the context of a multiplex network 
analysis (Snijders, Lomi and Torló, 2013). 
Results for average similarity reveal that the level of status attributed to an individual student 
by his or her peers tends to become similar to the level of status attributed to his or her network 
 
16 
 
partners – i.e., to change in the direction of greater similarity (or to remain similar) to network 
partners. Interestingly, the effect is only significant for the friendship network (positive average 
similarity parameter). This result is also confirmed when considering the two networks 
simultaneously in a multiplex analysis. Table 6a also shows that an important control variable 
such as ability does not have a significant effect on students’ status. The non-significant 
estimates of the linear shape parameter for both networks suggest that there is no evidence for 
a systematic directional effect (either upward or downward). The non-significant (negative) 
estimates of the quadratic shape parameter suggest that the influence of network partners 
sufficiently explains the observed fluctuation in status, and that there are no residual tendency 
of regression toward the mean (see Snijders, van de Bunt and Steglich (2010) for indication 
about how to interpret the shape parameters in SAOMs). Note, however, that the pattern of 
signs in the estimates (positive linear and negative quadratic shape parameter) suggests the 
presence of self-balancing (or self-correcting) tendencies regulating the distribution of status 
attributions among students in the sample. This implies that the status of high-status individuals 
is unlikely to increase indefinitely, and in fact it may decline above a certain threshold implied 
by the estimates. This conclusion would be consistent with recent research on the contextual 
nature of the Matthew effect on the accumulation of social status (Bothner et al., 2010). In 
Table 6a the estimated rate parameters describe the average number of opportunities for 
change in students’ status between measurement points. Estimates reveal that opportunities for 
change peak in the first period and decline in the second, suggesting a tendency of students’ 
status to stabilize over time. 
-- Insert Tables 6a and 6b about here – 
Table 6b reports the estimates of parameters in equation (2) specifying processes of social 
selection driving change in network ties over time. In both networks, there is no evidence of 
status homophily (status similarity parameter): students with similar status are not significantly 
more likely to select similar others as friends and advisors. We find interesting differences 
across networks in the social selection implications of status. High status students are generally 
more active in the friendship network – possibly a consequence of their greater freedom to 
choose network partners  (positive status ego parameter) and are sought after as advisors 
(positive status alter parameter) - a result that may be interpreted as an outcome of deference 
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and a tendency towards status ordering. In both networks, the estimated rate parameters are 
larger in the first period than in the second, suggesting that networks of friendship and advice 
tend to become more stable over time. 
Considered together, the results reported in Table 6b show that status affects the propensity to 
send or receive network ties in a way that is contingent upon the specific kind of network 
domains in which individuals participate. This highlights the importance of developing theories 
and models for improving our understanding of how the relation between social status and 
social networks might vary across social settings. As one would expect if students were fully 
informed about the aggregate distribution of status attribution in the classroom, status 
homophily does not seem to operate in the advice network: fully informed students would find 
it rational to go to advice to people with higher status. The positive alter effect of status 
provides further evidence of hierarchical ordering in the advice network (Agnessens and 
Wittek, 2012): other conditions equal, individuals prefer to choose high status advisers, i.e., 
advisers that attract deference from many others. This is clearly not the case in the friendship 
network: our third important results. High status students are very active in the friendship 
network. Together with the fact that the status homophily does not affect friendship ties, this 
result implies that the structure of the friendship network is not ordered by status. The estimates 
of the multiplex model confirm the results obtained on the individual networks. 
The estimated effects of the control factors and structural network effects reported in Table 6b 
are generally consistent with intuition and prior research. The negative outdegree effect 
suggests that students avoid creating network ties that are not embedded in more complex local 
structures. The significant Reciprocity effect parameter indicates that students prefer friendship 
and advice relations that are reciprocated. Both the friendship and the advice seeking networks 
are characterized by tendencies toward local hierarchical ordering as suggested by the positive 
transitivity and negative 3-cycles parameters. In addition, the Popularity of alter effect is 
included to control for the tendency of students who receive many friendship and advice ties to 
receive further friendship and advice ties (tendency of the current popularity to “cause” future 
popularity). In the advice network, the positive parameter suggests that popular advisors tend to 
attract extra-incoming advice requests. 
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We discuss the estimates of control variables reported in Table 6b only briefly and through 
illustrative examples. The main pattern is homophily, but differentiated with respect to the 
relation under consideration. The formation of friendship ties is facilitated by similarity in age, 
gender and nationality (positive age, gender and nationality similarity parameters) while the 
formation of advice ties is facilitated by similarity in academic background (positive academic 
background similarity parameter). Interestingly, in both network there is evidence for 
performance-based homophily (positive performance similarity parameter): students with 
similar performance are more likely to become friends and seek advice from each other. Yet, 
students with higher performance are less active in the friendship and advice from others 
(negative performance ego parameter) while they are more popular in the advice network 
(positive performance alter parameter). 
The results described above  are  confirmed by the multiplex analysis which allows studying 
processes of social selection driving change in several relations simultaneously (in this paper: 
friendship and advice). Most interestingly, the multiplex analysis has allowed us directly to test 
the extent to which different relations can impinge on one another. In particular, we find 
support for a direct association (entrainment) between friendship and advice (positive 
Friendship: Advice and Advice: Friendship parameters): which indicates a strong tendency of 
friendship and advice ties to co-occur. 
Tables 7a and 7b present the log-odds of increasing status compared to decreasing status as a 
function of the median status of friends (Table 7a) and advisors (Table 7b). Parameters are 
based on the Full Model as reported in Table 6a. Using the notation in (1), this is given by
, as dependent on the median status of the alters. For all the 
other variables, the mean values are used.  
-- Insert Tables 7a and 7b about here -- 
Table 7a shows that having friends of high status (as we have defined it) leads to a significant 
upward drift in one’s own status – what we have called a status assimilation effect. A status 
identical to one’s own leads to a small downward drift at lower status levels and a bigger 
upward drift for high levels. Friends with higher status provide a significant upward pull, while 
friends with lower status only a small downward pull. For advisors (Table 7b) the picture is 
( , 1) ( , 1)beh behf x z f x z  
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similarly interesting: advice received from low status students leads to a downward pull, while 
advice received from high status students leads to a significant upward pull.  Thus, advice 
received from high-status advisors appears to be beneficial in more than one way. Advice and 
friendship ties seem to transmit status in ways that are subtly different – but clearly detectable. 
Clearly, these conclusions have to be taken with care as the average similarity effects are 
numerically large but not statistically significant.  
Our discussion so far focused on the estimation and interpretation of individual parameters that 
are more strictly related to social selection and social influence processes as they pertain to 
status. This approach is consistent with the specification of a model based on micro-relational 
mechanisms and individual attributes, but containing no information on the global structure of 
the network.  We now ask:  how does the model based on the strictly local network 
mechanisms that we have specified reproduce global structural features of the network that was 
actually observed? We address this question in Figure 2 summarizing the results of a series of 
Monte Carlo simulation experiments based on the model implied by the estimates 
(corresponding to the full model as reported in Tables 6a and 6b).  The analysis follows closely 
the approach to goodness of fit for SAOMs recommended by Snijders and Steglich (2015) and 
implemented in the Software RSiena (Ripley et al., 2016).  Figure 2 reports the violin plots 
(Hintze and Nelson, 1998), for the indegree (Figure 2a) and outdegree (Figure 2b) distributions 
of the advice network. In Figure 2, the observed values are reported as red dots linked by a 
continuous red line, and associated to the corresponding counts, Dashed gray lines mark the 
upper and lower 2.5 percent values of the cumulative distribution. The plots in Figure 2 provide 
evidence of good fit for the actual changes observed in the data since the Monte Carlo 
Mahalanobis distance test p-values in both models are well above 0.054 (Lospinoso, 2012). 
The tests fails to reject the hypotheses that the actual data and the data simulated on the basis of 
the model estimates are significantly different (or, more precisely, “distant”).  The simulation 
analysis shows that our model of status as an antecedent and a consequence of social networks 
reproduces with high fidelity the main structural features of the network that was actually 
observed.     
                                                     
4 The Mahalanobis distance test is based on the test statistic 𝐷𝑥
2 =  (𝑥 − 𝜇𝑥)
𝑇Σ𝑥
−1(𝑥 − 𝜇𝑥),where Σ𝑥
−1 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥), and 𝜇𝑥 = 𝐸(𝑥). Of course (𝜇𝑥 , Σ𝑥
−1) are not known. For this reason a Monte Carlo test based 
on simulation is used, and inference is based on the empirical cumulative density of 𝐷𝑥
2. 
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-- Insert Figure 2 about here— 
Following the same procedure, we computed the goodness of fit diagnostics for status 
attribution. The results of our simulation-based exercise is summarized in  Figure 3 which 
reports the distribution of status in the sample The figure shows that the model reproduces well 
the (cumulative) distribution of status that was actually observed. 
-- Insert Figure 3 about here— 
When interpreted jointly, figures 2 (a and b) and figure 3 show that the model proposed is 
consistent with the observed in and out-degree distributions, and with the distribution of status 
that we actually observed. We are not aware of available studies attempting to link social status 
and social networks that have produced a comparable result in the context of a single model.    
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Status differentiation is a near-universal social phenomenon (Gould, 2002). Status is 
systematically associated with differential access to resources, and individual differences in 
evaluation of quality and social legitimacy (Bothner, Podolny and Smith, 2011; Burt, 2013; 
Phillips and Zuckerman 2001; Salganik, Dodds and Watts, 2006). The extent to which these 
differences erode social solidarity and cohesion, or encourage social integration remains one of 
the central problems in sociological theories of status in organizations (Bothner, Stuart and 
White, 2004).  
Our goal in this paper was to examine how the accumulation of status flows through the 
network ties that it contributes to create. Our findings demonstrate that the extent to which 
network ties transmit social status is contingent on the network domain under consideration:  
students tended to assimilate to the status of their friend, rather than the status of their advisors. 
How general this empirical conclusion might be is a matter for speculation. It could be, for 
example, than in a competitive educational setting network domains defined in terms of non-
instrumental relations (like friendship) provide better support for the transmission  of status 
perceptions. What is general beyond our context, however, is the importance of multiplexity in 
process of status construction and diffusion.   
 At the same time, we also found that status-based social selection varies across network 
domains: status makes students in our sample more active in their friendship networks, but 
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more popular in the advice network. These results may seem obvious: to the extent that social 
networks act as social infrastructures – or “pipes”  (Podolny, 2001) for the diffusion of 
influence, information and resources, differences in their internal “plumbing” ought to be 
associated with systematic individual differences among the nodes. What is less obvious is the 
active role that individual play in constructing their social infrastructure by changing “one-tie-
at-a-time.” The model we have presented in this paper specifies how this process of change 
affects – and is affected by change in individual status. Elaborating on Podolny’s powerful 
distinction (2001), networks are not only “pipes” through which resources and information 
flow, but also “prims” that change individual perceptions. In our study this is evident in our 
measure of status as a quality that is conferred by others, and on the basis of which perceptions 
are formed, change – and produce detectable social differences.   
One possible way to frame the results of the study is in terms of social exchange. Individuals 
select advisors based on their status, and then advisors receive status for the advice they agree 
to provide (Blau, 1964; Lazega, Mounier, Snijders and Tubaro, 2011). Our findings suggest 
important qualifications to this view as exchange of status for advice may happen not only 
within, but also across networks – thus emphasizing the importance of the role played by 
network multiplexity (Snijders, Lomi and Torló, 2013). Consistently with the prediction of 
social exchange theory, student in our sample try to obtain advice from high-status alters - 
possibly for instrumental reasons.  However, what diffuses status are the expressive activities 
inherent in the friendship network, rather than the instrumental activities inherent in the advice 
network. Thus, the exchange of advice for status also happens across networks. High-status 
students see their status recognized in the advice network. But-high status student can also be 
more active in establishing the friendship ties through which status diffuses. This result opens 
the way for a more detailed examination of the role played by multiplexity- or how one effects 
produced by one network may operate and propagate through another (Torló, Lomi and 
Snijders, 2017). 
A second way of framing our results is in terms of how status as the outcome of an aggregate 
social perception affects individual interpretations and meanings that individuals associate to 
network ties. This interpretation is supported by our representation of status as the consequence 
of attributions that may be influenced, but cannot be directly manipulated by individuals 
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(Martin, 1998). From this angle, our main finding is that, over time, students come to perceive 
the status of their peers as similar to the perceived status of their network associates. 
Consequently, students collectively perceived as high status in one time period, may see their 
status decline in the next if their network associates are perceived to have lower status. This 
interpretation not only is consistent with Podolny’s (2001: 58) view of networks as prisms 
“through which the qualities of actors are inferred (and, in our case, conferred) by potential 
exchange partners,” but it also links it to the specific micro-level mechanisms of network 
change that we have identified. 
The results we have reported suffer from a number of limitations. Three, in particular, deserve 
notice in this concluding section. The first limitation is linked to the specificity of the empirical 
setting that we have examined. While educational settings are useful because they reveal with 
clarity some of the relational aspects underlying processes of status construction in the absence 
of formal hierarchical distinctions, they also limit the scope of the results that might be 
obtained. Only attempts to replicate our results in different, and possibly more structured, 
organizational settings, can establish the extent to which our empirical results may be extended 
beyond the educational context that we have examined. It could well be than in more structured 
social settings (for example in formal organizations) the effect of positions occupied in a formal 
hierarchy will confound the deference relations that in our study we have observed among 
peers. In these settings, positions that individual occupy in the formal and informal hierarchies 
may become progressively decoupled – something that we do not observe in peer-groups like 
the one we examined in this paper.   
The second limitation is directly related to our approach to representing and measuring social 
status. While we think that linking status to deference is aligned with current theoretical 
understanding of status as a relational asset resulting from endogenous social attributions, we 
relied on an aggregate measure that made it impossible to examine how individual acts of 
deference become interdependent over time and give rise to relatively enduring status 
hierarchies. Thus our current study shares with similar studies the limitations that are inherent 
in considering status an aggregate variable that may be treated as an attribute, rather than a 
process emerging from sequences of individual acts of deference possibly characterized by 
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complex self-organizing properties. We think that this limitation provides a useful basis for 
future research into the mechanisms of status construction. 
The third limitation of the study is the reconstruction of social status as something that 
individuals “receive” from others. As we have discussed, we think that the construct we have 
used is consistent with the most recent theoretical accounts of status as an “altercentric” rather 
than a “egocentric” social process. We acknowledge, however, that our approach is only 
partially consistent with a strict interpretation of SAOM as models for utility-maximizing 
individual decisions. In the paper, we alleviated this inconsistency by interpreting the estimates 
as probabilistic behavioral tendencies, rather than outcomes of a strict preferences ordering. In 
the context of our study, the utility-maximization framework of the model was interpreted as a 
heuristic device for representing decisions rather than as a normative statement about how 
decisions ought to be made by rational actors. We call on future research to provide models in 
which agency can be imputed to both senders as well as receivers, and may be represented as 
the outcome of a joint decision making process. This discussion suggests that caution is needed 
in the interpretation of the empirical results we have reported and in the evaluation of their 
scope conditions. Despite these various limitations, we believe our study illustrates a general 
analytical strategy that may be adopted to examine how social networks and social status co-
evolve in a broad variety of social situations that may be of interest. Attempts to replicate the 
results reported in this study and extend them to different settings, may produce a better 
understanding of how social networks and social status coevolve and shape one another over 
time and across multiple network domains.  
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Figure legend 
Figure 1a - Evolution of the friendship network over time 
Figure 1b - Evolution of the advice network over time 
Figure 2a: Indegree distribution (p: 0.552) 
Figure 2b: Outdegree distribution (p: 0.414) 
Figure 2a and 2b. Diagnostic goodness of fit plots of the observed data (red line) against data 
simulated on the basis of the empirical estimates (number of simulations s = 1000). Dashed grey 
lines represent the 90 interval of the estimated distribution of networks. The p-values associated 
with the Mahalanobis distance test are reported under each figure. 
Figure 3. Diagnostic goodness of fit plots of the observed (cumulated) status 
variable (red line) against data simulated on the basis of the empirical estimates 
(number of simulations s = 1000). Dashed grey lines represent the 90 interval of 
the estimated distribution of networks. 
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Table 1– Attribute variables: descriptive statistics, N= 75 
(Standard deviations in parentheses) 
 
 
Variables Type Units of 
Measure 
Sample 
Statistic 
S.D. Min Max 
Business administration background 
Monadic Category 50% 
 
/ 1 6 
Percentage of foreign students (non-
Italian) 
Monadic Indicator 13% 
 
/ 1 2 
Proportion of males 
Monadic Indicator 62% 
 
/ 1 2 
Average Age  
Monadic Years 29 
 
3 24 40 
Work experience 
Monadic Months 19 
 
27 0 168 
GPA (Ability) 
Monadic Units 105.51 
 
4.71 93 111 
Performance 
Monadic Units 25.99 
 
1.59 20 30 
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Table 2- Descriptive network statistics
 
Network 
Statistics 
 
Definition 
Friendship 
T1 
Friendship 
T2 
Friendship 
T3 
Advice 
T1 
Advice 
T2 
Advice 
T3 
Average 
degree 
(s.d. 
in/out) 
Average number of edges 
 incident with nodes 
9.9 
(9.5/6.2) 
9.2 
(9.3/5.5) 
8.3 
(6.8/5.3) 
4.1 
(2.5/5.6) 
 
4.9 
(3.1/5.5) 
 
4.5 
(3.2/5.7) 
Reciprocity  Proportion of reciprocated ties 
 
0.58 
 
0.54 0.57 0.29 0.33 0.33 
Clustering 
Average density of the open 
neighborhood around each node 
 
0.44 
 
 
0.40 
 
 
0.38 
 
 
0.24 
 
0.24 0.26 
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Table 3. Change statistics for network ties over time: friendship and advice networks 
 
 
tktk+1 
 
 
0  0 
 
0  1 
 
1  0 
 
1  1 
 
Distance 
 
Missing 
 
Friendship       
12 4578 231 280 461 511 0 
2 3 4705 153 226 466 379 0 
 
Advice       
12 5060 183 123 184 306 0 
2 3 5058 125 151 216 276 0 
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Table 4 - Network effects included in the objective functions. Interpretation of the effects is exempliﬁed in the context of advice relations. 
 
Parameter Network statistics Interpretation (advice) Qualitative implications 
Social Influence mechanisms leading to change in individual status between consecutive time points    (t)                        (t+1) 
Linear and Quadratic Shape )( zzi  and 
2)( zzi   Representation of shape of the distribution of status 
scores in the long run 
 
Average similarity effect (influence) 
)/())((   j ijj jij xzzx
 
Actors tend to assimilate their status to the average 
status of their advisors 
  
Effect from attribute (e.g., ability) ii vzz )(   Main effect of attribute on status  
    
              Social Selection mechanisms leading to the formation of network ties between consecutive time points           (t)                           (t+1) 
Outdegree effect ijj x  If negative, actors tend not to seek advice from just anyone 
 
Reciprocity effect 

x ij
j
 x ji If positive, actors tend to reciprocate advice relations  
Transitive triplets effect 
 j h h jihij xxx  Actors tend to seek advice from those others from 
whom their current advisors also seek advice.   
 
Popularity of alter effect  
 j h hjij xx  
If positive, actors popular in the advice network in one 
time period tend   to receive even more requests in 
successive periods (with marginal decreasing sensitivity 
to popularity of actors) 
 
3-cycles effect  j h h ijhij xxx  
If negative, advice is hierarchical: actors do not seek 
advice in cyclical patterns. 
 
Attribute similarity effect 
(homophily) (e.g. Status) 
simij ijj x  Actors tend to seek advice from similar others (e.g., those who have similar status) 
 
Attribute alter  
(e.g. Status) 
 j jij zzx )(  If positive, actors seek advice from others with high 
status 
 
Attribute ego  
(e.g. Status) 
 j iij zzx )(  
If negative, actors with high status seek less advice 
from others 
 
Multiplex Effect (friendship) 
 
Entrainment: direct association (within tie). If positive, 
the existence of a friendship tie increases the likelihood 
for the creation of and advice tie  
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Dotted nodes represent students irrespective of their values for attributes. White (black) nodes represent students with low (high) value of attributes. Single arrow represents advice 
ties; Double arrow represents friendship ties.
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Table 5 – QAP correlations between advice, deference and friendship relations 5 
.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
5 All the correlation coefficients are significant at the level p<0.01 
 Advice 
T1 
Advice 
T2 
Advice 
T3 
Deference 
T1 
Deference 
T2 
Deference 
T3 
Friendship 
T1 
Friendship 
T2 
Friendship 
T3 
Advice T1 1.000 0.519 0.506 0.421 0.368 0.324 0.276 0.269 0.265 
Advice T2 0.519 1.000 0.584 0.370 0.496 0.389 0.262 0.363 0.348 
Advice T3 0.506 0.584 1.000 0.367 0.452 0.481 0.264 0.326 0.350 
Deference T1 0.421 0.370 0.367 1.000 0.555 0.507 0.240 0.229 0.245 
Deference T2 0.368 0.496 0.452 0.555 1.000 0.576 0.210 0.314 0.301 
Deference T3 0.324 0.389 0.481 0.507 0.576 1.000 0.186 0.252 0.273 
Friendship T1 0.276 0.262 0.264 0.240 0.210 0.186 1.000 0.591 0.527 
Friendship T2 0.269 0.363 0.326 0.229 0.314 0.252 0.591 1.000 0.674 
Friendship T3 0.265 0.348 0.350 0.245 0.301 0.273 0.527 0.674 1.000 
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Table 6a. Determinants of individual status (standard errors in parentheses). 
 
*p< 0.05.
EFFECTS 
Friendship 
(Null) 
Friendship 
(Restricted 1) 
Friendship 
( Restricted 2) 
Friendship 
(Full) 
Advice 
(Null) 
Advice 
(Restricted 1) 
Advice 
(Restricted 2) 
Advice 
(Full) 
Multiplex 
Analysis 
(F+A) 
Rate Period 1-2 
16.327 * 
(3.430) 
18.080 * 
(4.438) 
18.112 * 
(4.588) 
18.119 * 
(3.258) 
16.339 * 
(3.433) 
16.052 * 
(5.507) 
16.210 * 
(4.161) 
16.094 * 
(2.899) 
16.914* 
(8.488) 
Rate Period 2-3 
14.632 * 
(4.257) 
16.388 * 
(3.018) 
16.301 * 
(3.486) 
16.269 * 
(3.453) 
14.676 * 
(3.072) 
14.687 * 
(3.930) 
14.898 * 
(6.043) 
14.876 * 
(3.063) 
15.004+ 
(7.910) 
Linear Shape 
0.053 
(0.039) 
0.034 
(0.042) 
0.037 
(0.037) 
0.035 
(0.038) 
0.054 
(0.043) 
0.099 
(0.133) 
0.101 
(0.301) 
0.105 
(0.098) 
0.050 
(0.051) 
Quadratic Shape 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
-0.013 
(0.028) 
-0.013 
(0.008) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
Average similarity 
_ 
 
5.904 
(4.692) 
5.931 
(4.155) 
5.834* 
(2.984) 
_ 
 
-7.217 
(14.514) 
-6.965 
(16.815) 
-7.355 
(9.922) 
_ 
 
Average similarity 
(Friendship) 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 5.004* 
(2.575) 
Ability 
_ 
 
0.002 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
_ 
 
0.004 
(0.009) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
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Table 6b.Determinants of network ties (standard errors in parentheses). 
 
 
  
EFFECTS 
Friendship 
(Null) 
Friendship 
(Restricted 1) 
Friendship 
(Restricted 2) 
Friendship 
(Full) 
Advice 
(Null) 
Advice 
(Restricted 1) 
Advice 
(Restricted2) 
Advice 
(Full) 
Multiplex 
Analysis 
(F+A) 
F
R
IE
N
D
S
H
IP
 
 
Rate Period 1-2 7.641 * 
(0.359) 
15.704 * 
(1.111) 
15.853 * 
(0.996) 
15.688 *  
(1.071) 
_ _ _ _           
15.743*** 
(1.929) 
Rate Period 2-3 
5.527 * 
(0.306) 
8.722 * 
(0.615) 
8.850 * 
(0.594) 
8.756 * 
(0.628) 
_ _ _ _     9.348*** 
( 0.963) 
E
nd
og
en
ou
s 
 
ne
tw
or
k
 e
ffe
ct
s 
Outdegree (density) 
_ -1.868* 
(0.128) 
-2.639* 
(0.258) 
-2.532* 
(0.261) 
_ _ _ _     -2.503*** 
(0.167) 
Reciprocity 
_ 1.501* 
(0.108) 
1.414* 
(0.087) 
1.417* 
(0.090) 
_ _ _ _     1.404*** 
(0.122) 
Transitive triplets 
_ 0.139* 
(0.008) 
0.146* 
(0.009) 
0.146* 
(0.009) 
_ _ _ _     0.195*** 
(0.017) 
Popularity of alter  
(sqrt measure) 
_ -0.087* 
(0.042) 
-0.133* 
(0.046) 
-0.133* 
(0.047) 
_ _ _ _ 0.060 
(0.061) 
3-cycles 
_ -0.209* 
(0.021) 
-0.196* 
(0.023) 
-0.196* 
(0.023) 
_ _ _ _     -0.169*** 
(0.028) 
C
on
tr
ol
 c
ov
ar
ia
te
s 
ef
fe
ct
s 
Gender (M) alter 
_ 
 
_ 
 
-0.174 
(0.117) 
-0.159 
(0.113) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ 0.082 
(0.105) 
Gender (M) ego 
_ 
 
_ 
 
0.064 
(0.086) 
0.063 
(0.086) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ -0.120 
(0.102) 
Gender (M) similarity 
_ 
 
_ 
 
0.421* 
(0.143) 
0.403* 
(0.136) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _   0.225** 
(0.073) 
Ability alter 
_ 
 
_ 
 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ -0.005 
(0.011) 
Ability ego 
_ 
 
_ 
 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.012 
(0.007) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ 0.009 
(0.008) 
Ability similarity 
_ 
 
_ 
 
-0.060 
(0.147) 
-0.104 
(0.147) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ -0.151 
(0.229) 
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Age alter 
_ 
 
_ 
 
0.009 
(0.013) 
0.010 
(0.012) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ 0.020 
(0.013) 
Age ego 
  0.021 
(0.012) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
  _ _ 0.013 
(0.013) 
Age similarity 
_ 
 
_ 
 
0.406 
(0.214) 
0.417* 
(0.206) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _   0.481+ 
(0.249) 
Academic background alter 
_ 
 
_ 
 
-0.029 
(0.031) 
-0.030 
(0.029) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ -0.033 
(0.034) 
Academic background ego 
_ 
 
_ 
 
-0.082* 
(0.032) 
-0.090* 
(0.033) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ -0.090* 
(0.034) 
Academic background similarity 
_ 
 
_ 
 
-0.072 
(0.152) 
-0.096 
(0.162) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ -0.162 
(0.211) 
Work experience alter 
_ 
 
_ 
 
-0.044 
(0.077) 
-0.049 
(0.074) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ -0.060 
(0.098) 
Work experience ego _ 
 
_ 
 
-0.013 
(0.072) 
-0.069 
(0.074) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ -0.046 
(0.076) 
Work experience similarity _ 
 
_ 
 
0.042 
(0.060) 
0.041 
(0.063) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ 0.005 
( 0.069) 
Nationality alter _ 
 
_ 
 
-0.033* 
(0.118) 
-0.012 
(0.118) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ 0.347* 
(0.139) 
Nationality ego 
_ 
 
_ 
 
0.505* 
(0.207) 
0.430* 
(0.200) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ 0.285* 
(0.127) 
Nationality similarity 
_ 
 
_ 
 
0.577* 
(0.243) 
0.461* 
(0.221) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ 0.419** 
(0.119) 
Performance alter 
_ 
 
_ 
 
-0.007 
(0.026) 
-0.015 
(0.030) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ -0.046 
(0.036) 
Performance ego 
_ 
 
_ 
 
-0.069* 
(0.029) 
-0.132* 
(0.032) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ -0.119** 
(0.032) 
Performance similarity 
_ 
 
_ 
 
0.836* 
(0.193) 
0.996* 
(0.205) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _    1.029 *** 
(0.211) 
S
ta
tu
s 
fe
ed
ba
ck
 
ef
fe
ct
s 
Status alter 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
0.005 
(0.009) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_  0.005 
(0.009) 
Status ego 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
0.026* 
(0.009) 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_   0.026 * 
(0.011) 
Status similarity 
 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
0.157 
(0.388) 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 0.083 
(0.452) 
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EFFECTS 
Friendship 
(Null) 
Friendship 
(Restricted 1) 
Friendship 
(Restricted 
2) 
Friendship 
(Full) 
Advice 
(Null) 
Advice 
(Restricted 1) 
Advice 
(Restricted 
2) 
Advice 
(Full) 
Multiplex 
Analysis 
(F+A) 
A
D
V
IC
E
 
 Rate Period 1-2 
_ _ _ _ 4.401 * 
(0.268) 
8.003 * 
(0.732) 
7.999 * 
(0.821) 
8.052 * 
(0.781) 
    9.078*** 
(1.094) 
Rate Period 2-3 
_ _ _ _ 3.945 * 
(0.248) 
5.839 * 
(0.557) 
5.926 * 
(0.545) 
5.939 * 
(0.510) 
    6.632*** 
(0.600) 
E
nd
og
en
ou
s 
 
ne
tw
or
k
 e
ffe
ct
s 
Outdegree (density) 
_ _ _ _ _ -2.482* 
(0.116) 
-2.812* 
(0.680) 
-2.690* 
(0.341) 
    -3.156*** 
(0.202) 
Reciprocity 
_ _ _ _ _ 1.209* 
(0.133) 
1.192* 
(0.163) 
1.204* 
(0.130) 
    0.908*** 
(0.216) 
Transitive triplets 
_ _ _ _ _ 0.211* 
(0.022) 
0.205* 
(0.026) 
0.203* 
(0.022) 
     0.237*** 
(0.041) 
Popularity of alter  
(sqrt measure) 
_ _ _ _ _ 0.211* 
(0.043) 
0.143* 
(0.051) 
0.081* 
(0.041) 
    0.261*** 
(0.061) 
3-cycles 
_ _ _ _ _ -0.247* 
(0.074) 
-0.206* 
(0.063) 
-0.184* 
(0.062) 
      -0.109 
(0.062)  
C
on
tr
ol
 c
ov
ar
ia
te
s 
ef
fe
ct
s 
Gender (M) alter 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ _ 
 
_ 
 
-0.175 
(0.170) 
-0.153 
(0.153) 
-0.017 
(0.112) 
Gender (M) ego 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ _ 
 
_ 
 
-0.185 
(0.114) 
-0.193 
(0.109) 
-0.208 
(0.121) 
Gender (M) similarity 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ _ 
 
_ 
 
0.218 
( 0.178) 
0.203 
(0.177) 
0.072 
(0.092) 
Ability alter 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ _ 
 
_ 
 
0.001 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.013 
(0.013) 
Ability ego 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ _ 
 
_ 
 
-0.017 
(0.014) 
-0.018 
(0.010) 
-0.011 
(0.011) 
Ability similarity 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ _ 
 
_ 
 
0.223 
(0.335) 
0.234 
(0.194) 
0.272 
(0.243) 
Age alter 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ _ 
 
_ 
 
0.007 
(0.020) 
-0.005 
(0.016) 
-0.026 
(0.018) 
Age ego 
  _ _   0.018 
(0.018) 
0.019 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.019) 
Age similarity 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ _ 
 
_ 
 
0.376 
(0.367) 
0.314 
(0.274) 
-0.174 
(0.273) 
Academic background alter 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ _ 
 
_ 
 
0.025 
(0.050) 
0.026 
(0.033) 
0.018 
(0.037) 
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* p< 0.05. 
Academic background ego 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ _ 
 
_ 
 
0.020 
(0.059) 
0.019 
(0.035) 
0.003 
(0.036) 
Academic background similarity 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ _ 
 
_ 
 
0.419* 
(0.184) 
0.409* 
(0.181) 
0.393* 
(0.193) 
Work experience alter 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ _ 
 
_ 
 
0.151 
(0.096) 
0.112 
(0.095) 
0.030 
(0.118) 
Work experience ego _ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ _ 
 
_ 
 
0.061 
(0.095) 
0.086 
(0.094) 
0.089 
(0.111) 
Work experience similarity _ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ _ 
 
_ 
 
0.136 
(0.081) 
0.133 
(0.078) 
0.133 
(0.097) 
Nationality alter _ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ _ 
 
_ 
 
-0.164 
(0.286) 
-0.183 
(0.173) 
0.155 
(0.191) 
Nationality ego 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ _ 
 
_ 
 
-0.102 
(0.875) 
-0.087 
(0.316) 
-0.102 
(0.184) 
Nationality similarity 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ _ 
 
_ 
 
0.236 
(0.779) 
0.264 
(0.337) 
0.362* 
(0.170) 
Performance alter 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ _ 
 
_ 
 
0.126* 
(0.057) 
0.092* 
(0.042) 
0.114* 
(0.047) 
Performance ego 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ _ 
 
_ 
 
-0.106 
(0.085) 
-0.091* 
(0.043) 
-0.125* 
(0.059) 
Performance similarity 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ _ 
 
_ 
 
0.765 
(0.491) 
0.762* 
(0.264) 
0.810* 
(0.345) 
S
ta
tu
s 
fe
ed
ba
ck
 
ef
fe
ct
s 
Status alter 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
0.020* 
(0.010) 
0.020* 
(0.010) 
Status ego 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
Status similarity 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ _ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
0.188 
(0.390) 
0.342 
(0.385) 
M
ul
ti
pl
e
x
 e
ffe
ct
s Friendship: Advice 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
   1.729*** 
(0.260) 
Advice: Friendship 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
   1.306*** 
       (0.138) 
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Table 7a – Influence of friends on log odds of status increase compared to status decrease, 
if all friends have the same status (Status [min, max] = [1, 31]).  
 
 Alter 
E
go
  Low         High 
Low 0.03 0.46 
High 1.05 1.44 
 
 
Table 7b – Influence of advisors on log odds of status increase compared to status decrease, 
if all advisors have the same status (Status [min, max] = [1, 31]) 
 
 
 Alter 
E
go
  Low          High 
Low 0.06 0.95 
High -0.53 0.78 
 
